Mãos no Leme, Olhos no Mar: Como a Face do Conselho Reflete a Estratégia Fiscal da Empresa? / Hands on the Helm, Eyes on the Sea: How Does the Face of the Board Reflect the Company's Fiscal Strategy?
Resumo
A pesquisa tem como objetivo geral identificar o perfil do conselho de administração das empresas brasileiras listadas que realizaram transações com partes relacionadas, localizadas em países considerados paraísos fiscais. A abordagem metodológica foi descritiva, documental e quantitativa, envolvendo 30 empresas brasileiras listadas na B3 que realizaram transações com partes relacionadas em países classificados como paraísos fiscais, entre 2022 e 2024. Quanto às características conselho de administração, foram considerados o tamanho, independência, expertise financeira, dualidade, gênero e idade. Evidenciou-se que os maiores volumes de transações com partes relacionadas concentram-se nos segmentos de NM e N2. Quanto ao perfil de composição do conselho de administração das empresas analisadas, apurou-se que atendem, em sua maioria, às orientações do IBGC em relação ao tamanho, independência, expertise financeira e dualidade. Já a presença de mulheres, ainda é discreta. Quanto à idade média dos membros, oscilou entre 54 e 60 anos. Os achados apontam para um cenário cujas práticas de planejamento tributário internacional estão presentes entre empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, independentemente do nível de GC em que estão alocadas. A sofisticação dessas estruturas e sua persistência ao longo do período sugerem que elas são parte integrante da estratégia corporativa, supervisionadas pelos conselhos de administração, e não resultado de lacunas de controle. Isso é um convite à reflexão sobre os limites e as possibilidades da GC como mecanismo de moderação do planejamento tributário agressivo no contexto brasileiro, em linha com as preocupações expressas pela OCDE (2013) quanto à erosão da base tributária global.
Palavras-chave: Paraísos fiscais. Conselho de Administração. Governança corporativa. Profit shifting. Transações com partes relacionadas. Planejamento tributário.
ABSTRACT
The overall objective of this research is to identify the profile of the board of directors of listed Brazilian companies that have conducted transactions with related parties located in countries considered tax havens. The methodological approach was descriptive, documentary, and quantitative, involving 30 Brazilian companies listed on the B3 that conducted transactions with related parties in countries classified as tax havens between 2022 and 2024. Regarding the characteristics of the board of directors, size, independence, financial expertise, duality, gender, and age were considered. It was evident that the largest volumes of transactions with related parties are concentrated in the NM and N2 segments. Regarding the composition profile of the board of directors of the analyzed companies, it was found that most meet the IBGC guidelines regarding size, independence, financial expertise, and duality. However, the presence of women is still discreet. The average age of the members ranged between 54 and 60 years. The findings point to a scenario in which international tax planning practices are present among publicly traded Brazilian companies, regardless of the level of corporate governance (CG) in which they are allocated. The sophistication of these structures and their persistence over the period suggest that they are an integral part of corporate strategy, overseen by boards of directors, and not the result of control gaps. This invites reflection on the limits and possibilities of CG as a mechanism for moderating aggressive tax planning in the Brazilian context, in line with the concerns expressed by the OECD (2013) regarding the erosion of the global tax base.
Keywords: Tax havens. Board of Directors. Corporate governance. Profit shifting. Related-party transactions. Tax planning.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12819/2026.23.7.3
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